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Reducing risk from trusted system access

Review staff and supplier access, data handling and incident evidence with proportionate controls that reduce risk without treating every anomaly as misconduct.

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A person with legitimate system access can still make a mistake, misuse information or have their account compromised. Suppliers and contractors may have access too.

Those situations need different responses. A large file download could be a planned migration, a mistaken export or an incident. Start with evidence and the purpose of the access instead of assuming misconduct.

The Cyber Centre’s insider threat guidance covers risks associated with access and knowledge of an organization’s systems. Use it to review controls proportionate to your records and work.

Make access explainable

Record who can reach important information, why they need it and who approves changes. Include supplier roles, administrative accounts, integrations and shared resources.

Give each person the least access their work needs. A bookkeeper needs the accounting system but probably not every client folder. The Cyber Centre also recommends keeping administrator and user roles separate. In practice, someone who manages Microsoft 365 or the firewall does it from a separate admin account and uses an ordinary account for email and browsing.

Review access when duties change as well as when someone leaves. Remove privileges no longer needed while preserving a working handoff and emergency access route.

When someone leaves, remove access on their last day. In the Microsoft 365 admin centre, an admin can go to Users > Active users, reset the person’s password, select Sign out of all sessions and block sign-in (Microsoft’s steps). Then change any shared passwords they knew and remove them from supplier portals, banking and other services outside Microsoft 365.

Use named accounts where possible. Shared credentials make it harder to tell who did what, and need a managed replacement plan.

Require multi-factor authentication on every account, especially administrator and supplier accounts, so a stolen password alone doesn’t give someone a trusted login.

Give staff practical handling rules

Explain where business information belongs, how it can be shared and where to ask for help. Use examples from the team’s work, such as a customer export or a supplier requesting access.

Give staff a tool that does the job. A policy that prohibits a workaround without resolving the underlying need can leave the same problem in place.

Split the tasks where one person could cause a large loss. For payments, one person can set up a new supplier or change banking details, and a second person approves the payment. The Cyber Centre’s guidance calls this two-person integrity and recommends it for critical operations. Confirm any change to a supplier’s banking details by calling a number you already have on file. Don’t use contact details from the request itself.

Make it easy to report accidental sharing promptly. Name who to tell, and a second person in case the concern involves the first. Early reporting supports containment and correction; blame can discourage it.

Review signals with context

Choose logs and alerts for specific risks, with an owner who can investigate them. Check that the records capture the activity you intend to review, and that only the people who need them can read them.

Email forwarding is a good place to start. A rule that quietly forwards a mailbox to an outside address can come from a compromised account or a departing employee. In Microsoft 365:

  • Default alert policies include Creation of forwarding/redirect rule and Suspicious email forwarding activity. Make sure the alert emails reach someone who reads them. Which alerts you get depends on your plan.
  • Automatic forwarding to outside addresses is controlled in the outbound spam policy. Microsoft recommends setting it explicitly to on or off, because the default behaves differently between organizations. The Auto forwarded messages report shows who’s forwarding now.

Data loss prevention (DLP) tools look for sensitive content, such as credit card numbers, being shared. Microsoft Purview DLP can show the user a warning or block the sharing, and Microsoft recommends running a new policy in simulation mode first so you can see what it would catch before it blocks anyone’s work.

Treat an alert as a reason to investigate. Confirm the account, activity, the work the person was asked to do and possible compromise before drawing conclusions about a person.

Review monitoring, screening and personnel investigations through the business’s privacy and employment processes. A background check doesn’t guarantee that future misuse can be predicted.

In Ontario, an employer with 25 or more employees on January 1 must have a written electronic monitoring policy. Ontario’s guide says it must state whether you monitor employees electronically and, if so, how, when and for what purposes. Describe any logging and alerting on staff activity there.

Coordinate the response and get advice first

Keep technical containment, record preservation and personnel decisions coordinated. Bring in privacy, legal or employment advice before acting on a suspicion about a person.

Restrict incident evidence to the people who need it. Review exposed records and remaining access routes even if the immediate account has been blocked.

Our cybersecurity work can help document those technical controls and connect them with the business’s incident response arrangements.


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