Six security gaps behind an incident review
Use an incident review to examine endpoint coverage, privileges, credentials, network boundaries, configuration and recovery with evidence and owners.

After an incident, a business needs to understand which protections failed, which worked and what’s still uncertain. A generic list of vulnerabilities won’t tell you how the attacker got in.
Without a security team, the review happens with your IT provider or the person who handled the cleanup. Ask them for a written summary and go through it together using the six areas below. The Cyber Centre’s incident-response guidance supports planning, response and learning from the event.
Who to call and what to keep
Make these calls early, while the cleanup is still under way:
- Your insurer, if you have cyber coverage. Read the notice clause first. It may set a deadline for telling the insurer, or require you to use its response firms before you hire anyone.
- Your bank, straight away, if money was sent or payment details were changed.
- Police and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre. The Anti-Fraud Centre asks victims to contact local police and to report online or at 1-888-495-8501. It shares reports with the RCMP’s National Cybercrime Coordination Centre.
- The Cyber Centre. Its reporting page asks a few questions and points an organization to the right place to report. You can also call 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788).
Keep one folder with dated notes of what happened and who did what, screenshots of ransom notes, the suspicious emails themselves, recovery invoices and a record of downtime. Your insurer will ask for most of it.
Some evidence doesn’t last. Microsoft Entra ID, the sign-in service behind Microsoft 365, keeps sign-in logs for seven days on its free edition and 30 days on P1 or P2. Ask your provider to export them on day one.
1. Devices missing the intended protection
Ask your provider for a list of every computer and server, showing whether its security software was installed, reporting in and up to date when the incident began. Compare it with what you own, including the laptop that goes home and the old PC in the back room.
Look for devices that never got the agent, ones where it stopped reporting, systems past their end of support and alerts that went to a mailbox no one checks. Having a product licensed doesn’t mean it was running on every device.
Don’t conclude that a particular attack technique was used just because a device lacked an agent.
2. Privileges broader than the work required
Ask for a list of everyone with administrator rights: on their own computer, in Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, in accounting or line-of-business software, and any supplier with remote access. Look for staff who use an admin account for everyday work, and for former employees and past suppliers who still have access.
Ask who needed each right and who granted it. Remove access that isn’t needed as part of the recovery, then check that everyday work still runs.
3. Credentials and sessions that weren’t accounted for
Find out how the attacker got in: a fake sign-in page, a reused password, a stolen session or an app someone allowed. Include shared accounts, app passwords and integrations as well as staff accounts.
Changing a password doesn’t end every session or remove app permissions an attacker granted. Microsoft’s steps for a compromised mailbox also revoke sessions, remove sign-in methods the attacker added, review consented apps and check for inbox rules and forwarding. Ask your provider to confirm each step was done. Securing email after a password reset covers them in more detail.
Note any gaps in multifactor sign-in, account recovery or ownership of stored secrets such as API keys. Changing passwords alone won’t close those gaps.
4. Connections that crossed an intended boundary
Ask how the attacker moved from the first account or device to anything else. In a small office that might be a flat network where the reception PC can reach the file server, a remote desktop port open to the internet or a supplier’s always-connected remote-access tool. Test any change to those paths with your provider at a quiet time, including the applications that could break.
Keep the paths an attacker could have used separate from the ones the evidence shows were used.
5. Configuration that drifted from the intended setup
Compare relevant settings with how things are supposed to be set up. Look for default passwords on routers and other equipment, setup or admin pages reachable from the internet, services no one uses and old exceptions without an owner.
Use vendor guidance and the Cyber Centre’s baseline controls to decide on fixes. Ask your provider how they’ll check that each fix stays in place.
Find out why the configuration drifted so the same exception doesn’t quietly return.
6. Recovery that didn’t match the affected service
If the incident involved ransomware, look at the access that let it spread and whatever slowed recovery. Ask how old the restored backups were, how long restoring took, what couldn’t be recovered and whether restored systems were checked before staff used them again.
If personal information was involved and PIPEDA applies to your business, you must report the breach to the Privacy Commissioner and notify the people affected when it creates a real risk of significant harm. You must also keep a record of every breach of security safeguards for at least two years, reported or not.
Assign corrective actions with owners and follow-up dates. Keep confirmed findings separate from hypotheses and verify the relevant controls after the recovery work is completed.


